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Edit File : SSL_verify_client_post_handshake.3 \| Size : 19.11 KB
.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 4.11 (Pod::Simple 3.35) .\" .\" Standard preamble: .\" ======================================================================== .de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) .if t .sp .5v .if n .sp .. .de Vb \" Begin verbatim text .ft CW .nf .ne \\$1 .. .de Ve \" End verbatim text .ft R .fi .. .\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \(-- will .\" give an unbreakable dash, \(PI will give pi, \(L" will give a left .\" double quote, and \(R" will give a right double quote. \(C+ will .\" give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used to do unbreakable dashes and .\" therefore won't be available. \(C` and \(C' expand to `' in nroff, .\" nothing in troff, for use with C<>. .tr \(W- .ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p' .ie n \{\ . ds -- \(W- . ds PI pi . if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(W\h'-12u'\(W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch . if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(W\h'-12u'\(W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch . ds L" "" . ds R" "" . ds C` "" . ds C' "" 'br\} .el\{\ . ds -- \\|\(em\\| . ds PI \(p . ds L" `` . ds R" '' . ds C` . ds C' 'br\} .\" .\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform. .ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq .el .ds Aq ' .\" .\" If the F register is >0, we'll generate index entries on stderr for .\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index .\" entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process the .\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion. .\" .\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'. .de IX .. .nr rF 0 .if \n(.g .if rF .nr rF 1 .if (\n(rF:(\n(.g==0)) \{\ . if \nF \{\ . de IX . tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2" .. . if !\nF==2 \{\ . nr % 0 . nr F 2 . \} . \} .\} .rr rF .\" .\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2). .\" Fear. Run. Save yourself. No user-serviceable parts. . \" fudge factors for nroff and troff .if n \{\ . ds #H 0 . ds #V .8m . ds #F .3m . ds #[ \f1 . ds #] \fP .\} .if t \{\ . ds #H ((1u-(\\\\n(.fu%2u)).13m) . ds #V .6m . ds #F 0 . ds #[ \& . ds #] \& .\} . \" simple accents for nroff and troff .if n \{\ . ds ' \& . ds ` \& . ds ^ \& . ds , \& . ds ~ ~ . ds / .\} .if t \{\ . ds ' \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu8/10-\(#H)'\'\h"\|\\n:u" . ds ` \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu8/10-\(#H)'\`\h'\|\\n:u' . ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu10/11-\(#H)'^\h'\|\\n:u' . ds , \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu8/10)',\h'\|\\n:u' . ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu-\(#H-.1m)'~\h'\|\\n:u' . ds / \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu8/10-\(#H)'\z\(sl\h'\|\\n:u' .\} . \" troff and (daisy-wheel) nroff accents .ds : \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu8/10-\(#H+.1m+\(#F)'\v'-\(#V'\z.\h'.2m+\(#F'.\h'\|\\n:u'\v'\(#V' .ds 8 \h'\(#H'\(b\h'-\(#H' .ds o \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu+\w'\(de'u-\(#H)/2u'\v'-.3n'\(#[\z\(de\v'.3n'\h'\|\\n:u'\(#] .ds d- \h'\(#H'\(pd\h'-\w'~'u'\v'-.25m'\f2\(hy\fP\v'.25m'\h'-\(#H' .ds D- D\\k:\h'-\w'D'u'\v'-.11m'\z\(hy\v'.11m'\h'\|\\n:u' .ds th \(#[\v'.3m'\s+1I\s-1\v'-.3m'\h'-(\w'I'u2/3)'\s-1o\s+1\(#] .ds Th \(#[\s+2I\s-2\h'-\w'I'u3/5'\v'-.3m'o\v'.3m'\(#] .ds ae a\h'-(\w'a'u4/10)'e .ds Ae A\h'-(\w'A'u4/10)'E . \" corrections for vroff .if v .ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu9/10-\(#H)'\s-2\u~\d\s+2\h'\|\\n:u' .if v .ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu10/11-\(#H)'\v'-.4m'^\v'.4m'\h'\|\\n:u' . \" for low resolution devices (crt and lpr) .if \n(.H>23 .if \n(.V>19 \ \{\ . ds : e . ds 8 ss . ds o a . ds d- d\h'-1'\(ga . ds D- D\h'-1'\(hy . ds th \o'bp' . ds Th \o'LP' . ds ae ae . ds Ae AE .\} .rm #[ #] #H #V #F C .\" ======================================================================== .\" .IX Title "SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3" .TH SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3 "2023-09-11" "1.1.1w" "OpenSSL" .\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. .if n .ad l .nh .SH "NAME" SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify, SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth, SSL_verify_cb, SSL_verify_client_post_handshake, SSL_set_post_handshake_auth, SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth \&\- set peer certificate verification parameters .SH "SYNOPSIS" .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" .Vb 1 \& #include <openssl/ssl.h> \& \& typedef int (SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX x509_ctx); \& \& void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback); \& void SSL_set_verify(SSL ssl, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback); \& SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void); \& \& void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX ctx, int depth); \& void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL ssl, int depth); \& \& int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL ssl); \& void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX ctx, int val); \& void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL ssl, int val); .Ve .SH "DESCRIPTION" .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify()\fR sets the verification flags for \fBctx\fR to be \fBmode\fR and specifies the \fBverify_callback\fR function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the \s-1NULL\s0 pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR. .PP \&\fBSSL_set_verify()\fR sets the verification flags for \fBssl\fR to be \fBmode\fR and specifies the \fBverify_callback\fR function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the \s-1NULL\s0 pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR. In this case last \fBverify_callback\fR set specifically for this \fBssl\fR remains. If no special \fBcallback\fR was set before, the default callback for the underlying \&\fBctx\fR is used, that was valid at the time \fBssl\fR was created with \&\fBSSL_new\fR\\|(3). Within the callback function, \&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR can be called to get the data index of the current \s-1SSL\s0 object that is doing the verification. .PP \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()\fR sets the maximum \fBdepth\fR for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for \fBctx\fR. .PP \&\fBSSL_set_verify_depth()\fR sets the maximum \fBdepth\fR for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for \fBssl\fR. .PP \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR and \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR enable the Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the ClientHello such that post-handshake authentication can be requested by the server. If \fBval\fR is 0 then the extension is not sent, otherwise it is. By default the extension is not sent. A certificate callback will need to be set via \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb()\fR if no certificate is provided at initialization. .PP \&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR causes a CertificateRequest message to be sent by a server on the given \fBssl\fR connection. The \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag must be set; the \s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 flag is optional. .SH "NOTES" .IX Header "NOTES" The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically or'ed \fBmode\fR flags: .IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_NONE" \&\fBServer mode:\fR the server will not send a client certificate request to the client, so the client will not send a certificate. .Sp \&\fBClient mode:\fR if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the certificate verification process can be checked after the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake using the \fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\\|(3) function. The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result. .IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_PEER" \&\fBServer mode:\fR the server sends a client certificate request to the client. The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process fails, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure. The behaviour can be controlled by the additional \&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE\s0 and \&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 flags. .Sp \&\fBClient mode:\fR the server certificate is verified. If the verification process fails, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an anonymous cipher is used, \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is ignored. .IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT" \&\fBServer mode:\fR if the client did not return a certificate, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is immediately terminated with a \(L"handshake failure\(R" alert. This flag must be used together with \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0 .Sp \&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0) .IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE" \&\fBServer mode:\fR only request a client certificate once during the connection. Do not ask for a client certificate again during renegotiation or post-authentication if a certificate was requested during the initial handshake. This flag must be used together with \&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0 .Sp \&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0) .IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE" \&\fBServer mode:\fR the server will not send a client certificate request during the initial handshake, but will send the request via \&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR. This allows the \s-1SSL_CTX\s0 or \s-1SSL\s0 to be configured for post-handshake peer verification before the handshake occurs. This flag must be used together with \&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0 TLSv1.3 only; no effect on pre\-TLSv1.3 connections. .Sp \&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0) .PP If the \fBmode\fR is \s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0 none of the other flags may be set. .PP The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in verification procedure or using another application provided verification function set with \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\\|(3). The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information and the \fBverify_callback()\fR function, but the way this information is used may be different. .PP \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()\fR and \fBSSL_set_verify_depth()\fR set a limit on the number of certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates. Neither the end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates count against \fBdepth\fR. If the certificate chain needed to reach a trusted issuer is longer than \fBdepth+2\fR, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be issued. The depth count is \(L"level 0:peer certificate\(R", \(L"level 1: \s-1CA\s0 certificate\(R", \&\(L"level 2: higher level \s-1CA\s0 certificate\(R", and so on. Setting the maximum depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the trust-anchor). The default depth limit is 100, allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate \s-1CA\s0 certificates and a final trust anchor certificate. .PP The \fBverify_callback\fR function is used to control the behaviour when the \&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and receives two arguments: \fBpreverify_ok\fR indicates, whether the verification of the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not (preverify_ok=0). \fBx509_ctx\fR is a pointer to the complete context used for the certificate chain verification. .PP The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level (the root \s-1CA\s0 certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate. At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever a verification error is found, the error number is stored in \fBx509_ctx\fR and \fBverify_callback\fR is called with \fBpreverify_ok\fR=0. By applying X509_CTX_store_* functions \fBverify_callback\fR can locate the certificate in question and perform additional steps (see \s-1EXAMPLES\s0). If no error is found for a certificate, \fBverify_callback\fR is called with \fBpreverify_ok\fR=1 before advancing to the next level. .PP The return value of \fBverify_callback\fR controls the strategy of the further verification process. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 0, the verification process is immediately stopped with \(L"verification failed\(R" state. If \&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is terminated. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 1, the verification process is continued. If \fBverify_callback\fR always returns 1, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using \&\fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\\|(3) or by maintaining its own error storage managed by \fBverify_callback\fR. .PP If no \fBverify_callback\fR is specified, the default callback will be used. Its return value is identical to \fBpreverify_ok\fR, so that any verification failure will lead to a termination of the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake with an alert message, if \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is set. .PP After calling \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR, the client will need to add a certificate or certificate callback to its configuration before it can successfully authenticate. This must be called before \fBSSL_connect()\fR. .PP \&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR requires that verify flags have been previously set, and that a client sent the post-handshake authentication extension. When the client returns a certificate the verify callback will be invoked. A write operation must take place for the Certificate Request to be sent to the client, this can be done with \fBSSL_do_handshake()\fR or \fBSSL_write_ex()\fR. Only one certificate request may be outstanding at any time. .PP When post-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket message is sent to the client. .SH "BUGS" .IX Header "BUGS" In client mode, it is not checked whether the \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag is set, but whether any flags other than \s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0 are set. This can lead to unexpected behaviour if \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 and other flags are not used as required. .SH "RETURN VALUES" .IX Header "RETURN VALUES" The SSL_set_verify() functions do not provide diagnostic information. .PP The \fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR function returns 1 if the request succeeded, and 0 if the request failed. The error stack can be examined to determine the failure reason. .SH "EXAMPLES" .IX Header "EXAMPLES" The following code sequence realizes an example \fBverify_callback\fR function that will always continue the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake regardless of verification failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with more informational output. .PP All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain is printed on request. The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client certificates. .PP The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data into/retrieve application data from the \s-1SSL\s0 structure (see \fBCRYPTO_get_ex_new_index\fR\\|(3), \&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\\|(3)). .PP .Vb 7 \& ... \& typedef struct { \& int verbose_mode; \& int verify_depth; \& int always_continue; \& } mydata_t; \& int mydata_index; \& \& ... \& static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX ctx) \& { \& char buf[256]; \& X509 err_cert; \& int err, depth; \& SSL ssl; \& mydata_t mydata; \& \& err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); \& err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); \& depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); \& \& /* \& * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated \& * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object. \& / \& ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); \& mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index); \& \& X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256); \& \& / \& * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using \& * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so \& * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we \& * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition. \& * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not \& * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the \& * additional certificates would be logged. \& / \& if (depth > mydata\->verify_depth) { \& preverify_ok = 0; \& err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; \& X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err); \& } \& if (!preverify_ok) { \& printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\en", err, \& X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf); \& } else if (mydata\->verbose_mode) { \& printf("depth=%d:%s\en", depth, buf); \& } \& \& / \& * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use \& * it for something special \& / \& if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) { \& X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256); \& printf("issuer= %s\en", buf); \& } \& \& if (mydata\->always_continue) \& return 1; \& else \& return preverify_ok; \& } \& ... \& \& mydata_t mydata; \& \& ... \& mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL); \& \& ... \& SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER \| SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, \& verify_callback); \& \& / \& * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get \& * an appropriate error in the logfile. \& / \& SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1); \& \& / \& * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL \& * structure. \& / \& mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ... \& SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata); \& \& ... \& SSL_accept(ssl); / check of success left out for clarity / \& if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) { \& if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) { \& / The client sent a certificate which verified OK / \& } \& } .Ve .SH "SEE ALSO" .IX Header "SEE ALSO" \&\fBssl\fR\\|(7), \fBSSL_new\fR\\|(3), \&\fBSSL_CTX_get_verify_mode\fR\\|(3), \&\fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\\|(3), \&\fBSSL_CTX_load_verify_locations\fR\\|(3), \&\fBSSL_get_peer_certificate\fR\\|(3), \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\\|(3), \&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\\|(3), \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb\fR\\|(3), \&\fBCRYPTO_get_ex_new_index\fR\\|(3) .SH "HISTORY" .IX Header "HISTORY" The \s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 option, and the \fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR and \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. .SH "COPYRIGHT" .IX Header "COPYRIGHT" Copyright 2000\-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. .PP Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \(L"License\*(R"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. Back

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.ds ae a\h'-(\w'a'u*4/10)'e
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.    \" corrections for vroff
.if v .ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*9/10-\*(#H)'\s-2\u~\d\s+2\h'|\\n:u'
.if v .ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'\v'-.4m'^\v'.4m'\h'|\\n:u'
.    \" for low resolution devices (crt and lpr)
.if \n(.H>23 .if \n(.V>19 \
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.\}
.rm #[ #] #H #V #F C
.\" ========================================================================
.\"
.IX Title "SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3"
.TH SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3 "2023-09-11" "1.1.1w" "OpenSSL"
.\" For nroff, turn off justification.  Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
.if n .ad l
.nh
.SH "NAME"
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify, SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth, SSL_verify_cb, SSL_verify_client_post_handshake, SSL_set_post_handshake_auth, SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth \&\- set peer certificate verification parameters
.SH "SYNOPSIS"
.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
.Vb 1
\& #include <openssl/ssl.h>
\&
\& typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
\&
\& void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
\& void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
\& SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
\&
\& void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
\& void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth);
\&
\& int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl);
\& void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val);
\& void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val);
.Ve
.SH "DESCRIPTION"
.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify()\fR sets the verification flags for \fBctx\fR to be \fBmode\fR and
specifies the \fBverify_callback\fR function to be used. If no callback function
shall be specified, the \s-1NULL\s0 pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR.
.PP
\&\fBSSL_set_verify()\fR sets the verification flags for \fBssl\fR to be \fBmode\fR and
specifies the \fBverify_callback\fR function to be used. If no callback function
shall be specified, the \s-1NULL\s0 pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR. In
this case last \fBverify_callback\fR set specifically for this \fBssl\fR remains. If
no special \fBcallback\fR was set before, the default callback for the underlying
\&\fBctx\fR is used, that was valid at the time \fBssl\fR was created with
\&\fBSSL_new\fR\|(3). Within the callback function,
\&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR can be called to get the data index
of the current \s-1SSL\s0 object that is doing the verification.
.PP
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()\fR sets the maximum \fBdepth\fR for the certificate chain
verification that shall be allowed for \fBctx\fR.
.PP
\&\fBSSL_set_verify_depth()\fR sets the maximum \fBdepth\fR for the certificate chain
verification that shall be allowed for \fBssl\fR.
.PP
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR and \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR enable the
Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the ClientHello such that
post-handshake authentication can be requested by the server. If \fBval\fR is 0
then the extension is not sent, otherwise it is. By default the extension is not
sent. A certificate callback will need to be set via
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb()\fR if no certificate is provided at initialization.
.PP
\&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR causes a CertificateRequest message to be
sent by a server on the given \fBssl\fR connection. The \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag must
be set; the \s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 flag is optional.
.SH "NOTES"
.IX Header "NOTES"
The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically
or'ed \fBmode\fR flags:
.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0" 4
.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_NONE"
\&\fBServer mode:\fR the server will not send a client certificate request to the
client, so the client will not send a certificate.
.Sp
\&\fBClient mode:\fR if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the
server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the
certificate verification process can be checked after the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake
using the \fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3) function.
The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.
.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0" 4
.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_PEER"
\&\fBServer mode:\fR the server sends a client certificate request to the client.
The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process
fails, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is
immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
the verification failure.
The behaviour can be controlled by the additional
\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE\s0 and
\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 flags.
.Sp
\&\fBClient mode:\fR the server certificate is verified. If the verification process
fails, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is
immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an
anonymous cipher is used, \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is ignored.
.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT\s0" 4
.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT"
\&\fBServer mode:\fR if the client did not return a certificate, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0
handshake is immediately terminated with a \*(L"handshake failure\*(R" alert.
This flag must be used together with \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0
.Sp
\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0)
.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE\s0" 4
.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE"
\&\fBServer mode:\fR only request a client certificate once during the
connection. Do not ask for a client certificate again during
renegotiation or post-authentication if a certificate was requested
during the initial handshake. This flag must be used together with
\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0
.Sp
\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0)
.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0" 4
.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE"
\&\fBServer mode:\fR the server will not send a client certificate request
during the initial handshake, but will send the request via
\&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR. This allows the \s-1SSL_CTX\s0 or \s-1SSL\s0
to be configured for post-handshake peer verification before the
handshake occurs. This flag must be used together with
\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0 TLSv1.3 only; no effect on pre\-TLSv1.3 connections.
.Sp
\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0)
.PP
If the \fBmode\fR is \s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0 none of the other flags may be set.
.PP
The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in
verification procedure or using another application provided verification
function set with
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\|(3).
The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An
application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information
and the \fBverify_callback()\fR function, but the way this information is used
may be different.
.PP
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()\fR and \fBSSL_set_verify_depth()\fR set a limit on the
number of certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates.
Neither the
end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates count against \fBdepth\fR. If the
certificate chain needed to reach a trusted issuer is longer than \fBdepth+2\fR,
X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be issued.
The depth count is \*(L"level 0:peer certificate\*(R", \*(L"level 1: \s-1CA\s0 certificate\*(R",
\&\*(L"level 2: higher level \s-1CA\s0 certificate\*(R", and so on. Setting the maximum
depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the
trust-anchor).
The default depth limit is 100,
allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate \s-1CA\s0 certificates and
a final trust anchor certificate.
.PP
The \fBverify_callback\fR function is used to control the behaviour when the
\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and
receives two arguments: \fBpreverify_ok\fR indicates, whether the verification of
the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not
(preverify_ok=0). \fBx509_ctx\fR is a pointer to the complete context used
for the certificate chain verification.
.PP
The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level
(the root \s-1CA\s0 certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate.
At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever
a verification error is found, the error number is stored in \fBx509_ctx\fR
and \fBverify_callback\fR is called with \fBpreverify_ok\fR=0. By applying
X509_CTX_store_* functions \fBverify_callback\fR can locate the certificate
in question and perform additional steps (see \s-1EXAMPLES\s0). If no error is
found for a certificate, \fBverify_callback\fR is called with \fBpreverify_ok\fR=1
before advancing to the next level.
.PP
The return value of \fBverify_callback\fR controls the strategy of the further
verification process. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 0, the verification
process is immediately stopped with \*(L"verification failed\*(R" state. If
\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and
the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is terminated. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 1,
the verification process is continued. If \fBverify_callback\fR always returns
1, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification
failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can
however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using
\&\fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3) or by maintaining its
own error storage managed by \fBverify_callback\fR.
.PP
If no \fBverify_callback\fR is specified, the default callback will be used.
Its return value is identical to \fBpreverify_ok\fR, so that any verification
failure will lead to a termination of the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake with an
alert message, if \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is set.
.PP
After calling \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR, the client will need to add a
certificate or certificate callback to its configuration before it can
successfully authenticate. This must be called before \fBSSL_connect()\fR.
.PP
\&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR requires that verify flags have been
previously set, and that a client sent the post-handshake authentication
extension. When the client returns a certificate the verify callback will be
invoked. A write operation must take place for the Certificate Request to be
sent to the client, this can be done with \fBSSL_do_handshake()\fR or \fBSSL_write_ex()\fR.
Only one certificate request may be outstanding at any time.
.PP
When post-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket
message is sent to the client.
.SH "BUGS"
.IX Header "BUGS"
In client mode, it is not checked whether the \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag
is set, but whether any flags other than \s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0 are set. This can
lead to unexpected behaviour if \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 and other flags are not used as
required.
.SH "RETURN VALUES"
.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information.
.PP
The \fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR function returns 1 if the request
succeeded, and 0 if the request failed. The error stack can be examined
to determine the failure reason.
.SH "EXAMPLES"
.IX Header "EXAMPLES"
The following code sequence realizes an example \fBverify_callback\fR function
that will always continue the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake regardless of verification
failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with
more informational output.
.PP
All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain
is printed on request.
The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client
certificates.
.PP
The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data
into/retrieve application data from the \s-1SSL\s0 structure
(see \fBCRYPTO_get_ex_new_index\fR\|(3),
\&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\|(3)).
.PP
.Vb 7
\& ...
\& typedef struct {
\&   int verbose_mode;
\&   int verify_depth;
\&   int always_continue;
\& } mydata_t;
\& int mydata_index;
\&
\& ...
\& static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
\& {
\&     char    buf[256];
\&     X509   *err_cert;
\&     int     err, depth;
\&     SSL    *ssl;
\&     mydata_t *mydata;
\&
\&     err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
\&     err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
\&     depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
\&
\&     /*
\&      * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
\&      * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
\&      */
\&     ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
\&     mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);
\&
\&     X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
\&
\&     /*
\&      * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
\&      * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
\&      * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
\&      * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
\&      * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
\&      * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
\&      * additional certificates would be logged.
\&      */
\&     if (depth > mydata\->verify_depth) {
\&         preverify_ok = 0;
\&         err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
\&         X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
\&     }
\&     if (!preverify_ok) {
\&         printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\en", err,
\&                X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
\&     } else if (mydata\->verbose_mode) {
\&         printf("depth=%d:%s\en", depth, buf);
\&     }
\&
\&     /*
\&      * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
\&      * it for something special
\&      */
\&     if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) {
\&         X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
\&         printf("issuer= %s\en", buf);
\&     }
\&
\&     if (mydata\->always_continue)
\&         return 1;
\&     else
\&         return preverify_ok;
\& }
\& ...
\&
\& mydata_t mydata;
\&
\& ...
\& mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);
\&
\& ...
\& SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
\&                    verify_callback);
\&
\& /*
\&  * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
\&  * an appropriate error in the logfile.
\&  */
\& SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);
\&
\& /*
\&  * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
\&  * structure.
\&  */
\& mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
\& SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);
\&
\& ...
\& SSL_accept(ssl);       /* check of success left out for clarity */
\& if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {
\&     if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
\&         /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
\&     }
\& }
.Ve
.SH "SEE ALSO"
.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
\&\fBssl\fR\|(7), \fBSSL_new\fR\|(3),
\&\fBSSL_CTX_get_verify_mode\fR\|(3),
\&\fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3),
\&\fBSSL_CTX_load_verify_locations\fR\|(3),
\&\fBSSL_get_peer_certificate\fR\|(3),
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\|(3),
\&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\|(3),
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb\fR\|(3),
\&\fBCRYPTO_get_ex_new_index\fR\|(3)
.SH "HISTORY"
.IX Header "HISTORY"
The \s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 option, and the \fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR
and \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
.SH "COPYRIGHT"
.IX Header "COPYRIGHT"
Copyright 2000\-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
.PP
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R").  You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.

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